The study examined 534 hostage and barricade incidents. Its objective was to present an integrated and formalized vision of current conceptualizations of critical incidents to optimize decision making. To this end, logistic regression and recursive partitioning models are presented and compared. In all, 18 distinct static and dynamic individual and situational factors were used to predict various outputs during this type of situation. Results highlight the importance of considering the origin of the emergency call and being barricaded in one's home in the assessment of perpetrator's propensity for violence, the fact that time is not always on the police's side during critical incidents, and the relatively minor importance of hostage taking in the general comprehension of these high-risk events.
THE PERPETUAL RISK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
The prediction of imminent violent behavior is of crucial importance to decision makers managing hostage and barricade incidents, mainly because of the omnipresent risk of violence. There are several reasons for this. First, the instigators of these crisis situations are disorganized, exhibit impaired judgement, and have, especially in the first 45 minutes of the incidents, a limited ability to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions (Noesner & Dolan, 1992) . Second, the consumption of intoxicants-observed in two thirds of perpetrators (Michaud, St-Yves, & Guay, 2008 )-stimulates irritability and aggressiveness, which accentuates this impairment in judgement and increases the propensity to violence (Fagan, 1990 (Fagan, , 1993 Murphy & Wetzel, 1990; Parker & Auerhahn, 1998) . Third, the perpetrators are generally unprepared for the arrival of the police, as the emergency call to authorities is usually made by a witness or someone close to them (Michaud et al., 2008) . The arrival of the police is therefore an additional emotional burden and a potential source of frustration. Fourth, the recognition by the perpetrators of the only two probable-but not initially expected-outcomes of the incident (surrender, with eventual criminal conviction, or death) is surely a significant cause of dissatisfaction that can promote violence. Finally, perpetrators may be driven to violence by negotiators' incessant attempts to establish verbal contact, by their realization of their precarious position (besieged, with a limited range of movement), or by their fear of being overcome by force. Police experience indicates that the potential for violence is higher when the perpetrator is barricaded in his or her home (Flood & Dalfonzo, 2005) or when he or she disposes of a considerable arsenal, such as multiple weapons and ample ammunition (Strentz, 2005) .
PREDICTING VIOLENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF VALID AND RELIABLE TOOLS
According to Meehl (1954) , there are two approaches to risk assessment: application of predictive actuarial rules based on statistical probability and clinical prognostics based on practical experience. In critical incidents, each of these approaches has limitations that significantly alter its effectiveness in predicting violence.
The generic actuarial instruments currently used to predict violence are ill suited to the operational realities of hostage and barricade incidents. First, none of them have been validated for the populations encountered in such situations. Second, although the goal in hostage and barricade incidents is the prediction of imminent violent behavior (i.e., violence in the first few minutes and hours of the incident), the majority of these instruments focus on the prediction of violence over the short (days, weeks) or long (months, years) term. Examples of the former are the Broset Violence Checklist (Almvik, Woods, & Rasmussen, 2000) and the Short-Term Assessment of Risk and Treatability (Webster, Martin, Brink, Nicholls, & Middleton, 2004) , whereas examples of the latter are Hare's Psychopathy Checklist (Hare, 1991 (Hare, , 2003 , the Historical, Clinical and Risk Management 20-item scale (Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) , and the Violence Risk Assessment Guide (Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998) . Third, this type of high-risk situation is associated with decisional urgency, a context for which existing actuarial instruments have not been developed. For example, some checklists may take considerable time to complete or may require information that may not be available at the time of assessment. Both of these requirements may lead to delays in assessing the risk.
Given the current state of actuarial instruments, clinical judgement based on firsthand practical experience is currently the only basis for predicting violence in hostage and barricade incidents. Clinical prognostics not only have poorer predictive power than probabilistic methods (Grove et al., 2000) and a tendency to overpredict violence (McAuley, 1993) but also are particularly complex to apply in such situations. There are two main reasons for this. First, the instigators of critical incidents are characterized by a high potential for unpredictable behavior. By its very nature, this type of crisis situation is triggered by individuals "[in] a temporary state of upset and disorganization, characterized chiefly by an individual's inability to cope with a particular situation using customary methods of problem solving" (Slaiku, 1990, p. 15 ). This state of disorganization, often compounded by intoxication and/or psychiatric problems (Michaud et al., 2008) , considerably increases the chances that the perpetrator will react irrationally and with no warning. The clinical assessment of the risk of violence-already complicated by unstructured intuitive prognostics and a context in which there is an urgent need for results-is thus rendered even more difficult. Furthermore, the relatively low prevalence of hostage and barricade incidents (Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner, & Gelles, 1998; Michaud et al., 2008) may hinder the predictive ability of decision makers managing critical incidents. This is because of, among other things, the fact that the effectiveness of clinical prediction is a function of several assessor-specific factors (knowledge, experience, motivation; Garb, 1998) .
AN INTUITIVE AND ANECDOTAL PREDICTIVE APPROACH
Currently, the only guidelines for decision making during hostage and barricade incidents are derived from police experience. Several authors (Fuselier, 1981; Noesner, 1999; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; have proposed predictors of a positive outcome: (a) a relationship of trust between the negotiator and the perpetrator, (b) a perpetrator who is more rational than emotional, (c) a perpetrator who opens up and talks at length, (d) a perpetrator who has stopped making threats and has expressed a desire to live, (e) the absence of gunshots and of inflicted injury since the beginning of the incident, (f) the release of hostages (where applicable), (g) the absence of repercussions for having failed to meet ultimatums issued by the perpetrator, and (h) a perpetrator who talks about his or her immediate future and the probable consequences of his or her actions and/or surrender.
Other authors (Call, 2003; Fuselier, Van Zandt, & Lanceley, 1991; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Strentz, 2005) have identified predictors of imminent danger during critical incidents: (a) the absence of verbal contact or satisfactory relationships with the perpetrator, even after several hours of negotiation; (b) the absence of explicit demands from the perpetrator; (c) insistence on face-to-face negotiations; (d) a perpetrator who insists on speaking to a specific person with whom he or she is in conflict; (e) an increasingly expressive and emotional individual in crisis; (f) a perpetrator who is isolated, has a limited social network, and has recently had to cope with several stress factors; (g) hostages who were deliberately chosen by, were known to, and had a history of conflict with the perpetrator; and (h) increasingly frequent and convincing threats of violence and/or suicide. The above situational factors are currently the main foundations of the intuitive and anecdotal predictive approach used by police officers during critical incidents.
The literature on hostage and barricade incidents has not really considered the personal factors associated with violent behavior. Research in psychiatry, psychology, and criminology has abundantly ploughed this field, however. For instance, significant links have been established between heteroaggressive behaviors (those directed against others) and male gender (Cross & Madson, 1997) , youth (Farrington, 1998) , poverty (Brownfield, 1986) , poor education (Kenway & Fitzclarence, 1997) , unemployment (Rodriguez, Lasch, Chandra, & Lee, 2001) , low IQ (Loeber & Hay, 1997) , prior criminal convictions (Salekin, Rogers, & Sewell, 1996) , and mental disorders (Link & Stueve, 1994; Monahan, 1981; Monahan & Steadman, 1994) . In the same vein, other variables have been proved to be valuable predictors of autoaggressive behaviors (those directed against oneself). These include subject history of suicide attempts (Kessler, Borges, & Walters, 1999) , history of suicide attempts in the subject's family (Roy, 1983) , and depression, often triggered by a significant loss in the subject's life (Isometsa et al., 1994) . Although these personal predictors of violent behavior are well established in the psychiatric, psychological, and criminological literature, they have not been validated in the particular context of hostage and barricade incidents.
In summary, the ability of police authorities to make predictions in hostage and barricade incidents is limited by several factors. Essentially, decision makers have no instruments adapted to their need to predict imminent violent behavior. Their decisions are thus exclusively based on professional judgement that is derived from police experience and that generates empirically untested anecdotal and intuitive predictions. As experience in other areas of criminology has shown, exclusively speculative prediction is bound to be inadequate (Grove et al., 2000) . Given the complex, high-risk, and high-stakes situations with which law enforcement personnel managing critical incidents are confronted, a structured decision-making process might yield better results than does the current reliance on intuitive strategies.
The present study was therefore undertaken to improve and formalize decision making in hostage and barricade incidents, through an empirical approach. To this end, two distinct predictive methods were used: logistic regression and recursive partitioning modeling. The initial analyses sought to identify various predictors of the recourse to autoaggressive and heteroaggressive behaviors by the perpetrator during the critical incident, using several criteria that are easily assessed at the outset of these crisis situations. The more fully decision makers understand the risk factors present in hostage and barricade incidents, the better equipped they are to detect high-risk situations and avoid irreparable acts. Subsequent analyses using the same criteria attempted to distinguish between predictors of three turning points in critical incident: (a) complete deployment of the specialized crisis-intervention structure, (b) successful verbal contact with the perpetrator, and (c) voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator. By identifying the criteria that best-and most poorly-characterize the principal structural elements of critical incidents, the results of this study will allow decision makers to make more judicious decisions, which will improve their chances of nonviolently resolving these high-risk situations.
METHOD POPULATION AND SAMPLING
We examined 534 hostage and barricade incidents that occurred in Quebec between 1990 and 2004 and were managed by the province's specialized crisis-intervention structure, the Sûreté du Québec's Groupe Tactique d'Intervention (GTI; tactical intervention group). 1 In each incident, the municipal police force, who were the first responders, assessed the situation and established an exterior perimeter on arriving on the scene. The situation then either was resolved or deteriorated to the point that they were obliged to retreat and request the assistance of the Sûreté du Québec's GTI. The GTI was deployed whenever the municipal police force was faced with an individual who refused to surrender to the police and at least one of the following conditions was met: (a) Hostages had been taken, (b) gunshots had been fired, or (c) the lives of the perpetrator or of others was in imminent danger.
The scope of the present study was therefore the total population of hostage and barricade incidents that were managed by an established intervention structure (Sûreté du Québec's GTI) during a defined period (1990 to 2004) . However, the events studied are not representative of all the hostage and barricade incidents that occurred in Quebec between 1990 and 2004. There are two main reasons for this. First, the less "problematic" critical incidents-with no hostage, no gunshot, and no imminent danger-were usually managed by municipal police forces without the participation of the Sûreté du Québec. Second, the hostage and barricade incidents occurring in Montreal, the province's biggest city, were not included in the study, as that city has its own specialized crisis-intervention structure, which manages all critical incidents in its territory, without the intervention of the Sûreté du Québec (there are some rare exceptions). Thus, this study relies on a biased sample of hostage and barricade incidents in Quebec which underrepresents less "problematic" critical incidents (i.e., events managed by municipal police forces) as well as crisis situations occurring in highly urban settings.
PROCEDURE AND CODING
After every crisis situation managed by the GTI, a postincident report of approximately 15 pages was written by the investigators involved. The information contained in these reports was primarily drawn from testimony (by police officers, victims, witnesses, family members, acquaintances) and official documents (police and/or correctional service databases, medical and psychiatric files). The use of multiple and cross-checked sources probably contributes to the quality of the information obtained. The document included a summary of the incident, the operation log, the negotiation log, a list of police personnel deployed, and descriptive information on the perpetrator and the characteristics of the incident. Of the 534 postincident reports studied, 25 were rejected because they were damaged or illegible.
To quantitatively analyze the qualitative data appearing in these postincident reports, an analytical checklist was developed from a sample of 50 randomly selected reports. A researcher meticulously analyzed the content of the reports and drew up a list of all the information that was available and efficiently codable. In all, 90 variables were created, and mutually exclusive categories corresponding to their possible values were clearly defined on the basis of the data collected. Variables were then coded for each of the 509 postincident reports, a task that required an average of 30 minutes per report. Conferring the coding to a single researcher ensured systematic and standardized measurement of the variables but had the disadvantage of precluding the validation of the measurements by analyses of interobserver agreement. To minimize the disadvantage of using one coder, a second coder later rescored a random sample of reports, as is described in the results section. The same researcher listened to audio recordings of the negotiations, when these were available (11.0% of cases), in an attempt to obtain data missing from postincident reports. Finally, to get more accurate criminal histories of the perpetrators, a restricted-access police database (Centre des Renseignements Policiers du Québec, Quebec Police Information Centre) was systematically consulted. It should be noted that this database was also available to decision makers during hostage and barricade incidents.
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Independent variables. In all, 18 predictors were used in the analyses. These were chosen on the basis of three main criteria: their theoretical relevance in the literature, their practical qualities for those working in the field (good ecological validity, information that is readily observable and promptly assessable on-scene), and their methodological attributes (no redundancy, few missing values, sufficient base rate, absence of obvious multicollinearity). The variables were then divided into three distinct domains: static personal factors, static situational factors, and dynamic situational factors. There were six static personal factors: (a) sex (0 = female, 1 = male), (b) age, (c) presence of known psychiatric problems, (d) presence of known suicide attempts, (e) number of convictions for nonviolent crimes, including all crimes against property and all other nonviolent crimes not involving firearms, and (f) number of convictions for violent crimes, including all crimes against persons and all crimes involving firearms. The six static situational factors were (a) whether at least one hostage was taken, (b) whether the perpetrator was intoxicated with alcohol and/or drugs and/or medication, (c) whether the emergency call was made by the perpetrator, (d) whether the incident was precipitated by conjugal or familial problems, (e) whether the perpetrator was barricaded in a residential home, and (f) the total number of weapons (blunt objects, bladed weapons, explosives, firearms, and other offensive weapons, such as longbows and crossbows) in the perpetrator's possession at the time of the incident. Finally, the six dynamic situational factors were (a) the time elapsed before the perpetrator spoke to a negotiator (i.e., the number of hours between the emergency call and the beginning of negotiation attempts), (b) whether gunshots were fired at any time, (c) whether the perpetrator immediately responded to contact (i.e., whether successful verbal contact was made within the first 5 minutes of attempts to begin negotiations), (d) whether the perpetrator made explicit demands, (e) the duration of the first verbal contact, as a proportion of the total duration of the negotiation period (the negotiation period was determined from a precise negotiation log that recorded the exact nature of the conversations between the negotiators and the perpetrator), and (f) the total duration of the negotiation period, as a proportion of the total duration of the operation (the total duration of the operation corresponds to the time elapsed between the beginning of negotiation attempts and the end of the operation-i.e., the point at which the perpetrator no longer represents a threat and/or is under the physical control of the police).
Dependent variables.
A total of five dichotomous dependent variables were used for the analyses. These were grouped into two domains: violent behaviors (two variables) and turning points of the incident (three variables). The first step was to determine the relationship between the various predictors and the probability of autoaggressive and heteroaggressive behaviors by the perpetrator during the police intervention. Accordingly, the first dichotomous variable was the presence of autoaggressive behaviors during the incident. These behaviors include explicit suicidal threats, writing of a suicide letter or note, self-mutilative behaviors, dangerous behaviors such as advancing on the police while pointing a firearm at them, attempted suicide, and suicide. "Suicide by cop" situations-where an individual provokes the police to be killed-were also considered autoaggressive behaviors. The second dichotomous variable was the presence of heteroaggressive behaviors-toward either hostages or the police-during the incident. Such behaviors include explicit death threats, physical assault, sexual assault, deliberate gunshot in the direction of another person for the purposes of wounding or killing him or her, attempted murder, and murder. These two dependent variables are thus not limited to the strictest definition of violent behavior but encompass the entire range of aggressive behaviors, regardless of their gravity. In other words, a manifestation of aggressiveness (a score of 1) was considered to have existed if the perpetrator had violent intent and clearly verbalized it, regardless of whether the violence was actually realized. The next step was to identify the relationship between various predictors and three turning points in the incident. A first dichotomous variable measured whether the specialized crisis-intervention structure (GTI) had been completely deployed. Complete deployment, it should be noted, coincided with the beginning of negotiators' attempts to make verbal contact. This variable was in some ways a proxy measure of the persistence of the perpetrator's disorganized crisis state. A second dichotomous variable indicated the success of negotiators in establishing verbal contact with the perpetrator once the intervention structure had been fully deployed. A final dichotomous variable reflected whether the fully deployed intervention structure was able to achieve a voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator. Involuntary and violent surrender (a score of 0) was considered to have occurred if the perpetrator was killed by the police, committed suicide, or necessitated the use of force by the tactical intervention unit (commonly known as the SWAT team).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
To improve predictive power during critical incidents, two distinct but complementary analyses were conducted. First, we performed logistic regression, an analysis that follows a logic essentially intended to assess the relative weight of various predictors to quantify their main effect on the occurrence of a dependent variable. In this study, our logistic regression analyses had 80% power to detect an odds ratio (OR) of 2.4 for risk factors with a prevalence of 20% or greater or an OR of 2.0 for risk factors with a prevalence of 40% or greater, at a two-tailed alpha of .05. Risk factors with ORs of less than 2.0 were unlikely to be detected by the analyses. Second, we performed recursive partitioning modeling, also known as classification and regression tree (CART) analysis (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984) . This predictive approach has several advantages over traditional analyses. Among other things, CART analysis provides a simple graphical decision tree representation of relations, analyzes the hierarchical structure of the prediction, allows for simultaneous analysis of a large number of categorical and continuous predictors, and takes into account interaction effects. In the present study, CART analysis was performed with the following criteria: (a) The maximum tree depth was of five levels below root, (b) the minimum number of cases was 50 for parent nodes and 25 for child nodes, and (c) the impurity measure for categorical targets was a Gini coefficient.
Subsequently, the predictive power of each model-obtained from logistic regression or CART analysis-was estimated by an area under the curve (AUC) coefficient based on receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analyses. The AUC coefficient varies from .5 (random prediction, accurate in half the cases) to 1.0 (prediction accurate in all cases) and allows models to be compared to each other to identify the ones with the best predictive power. AUCs were compared using the totally nonparametric method of DeLong, DeLong, and Clarke-Pearson (1988), which uses the Mann-Whitney U statistic to estimate the AUC and its standard error (SE) for each of the correlated curves, followed by the covariance and correlation matrices of the curves. This procedure uses structural components analysis to contrast the curves and generates a chi-square statistic with a two-tailed p value.
RESULTS

INTERRATER RELIABILITY ANALYSES
Before proceeding with further statistical analyses, it was crucial to assess the reliability of our measurements. Consequently, a second person was asked to rescore 18 variables (i.e., all the predictors used in our analyses) in a random sample of 150 hostage and barricade postincident reports (which represents approximately 30% of the total sample), using the same analytical checklist used by the initial coder. Overall, results of the interrater reliability analyses show substantial agreement in our measurements (Landis & Koch, 1977; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) . In fact, the Kappa value (κ) for the 11 dichotomous independent variables ranged from 0.56 to 1.00 (M = 0.73, SD = 0.15), and the intraclass correlation coefficient (ρ I ) for the 7 continuous independent variables ranged from 0.73 to 1.00 (M = 0.89, SD = 0.11). The interrater reliability value of each predictor is presented in Table 1 .
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES
Descriptive statistics for all of the 18 independent variables used in our analyses are also presented in Table 1 . As for the dependent variables, autoaggressive and heteroaggressive behaviors were observed in 76.2% and 38.2% of perpetrators, respectively. Complete deployment of the crisis-intervention structure (GTI) was achieved in 74.9% of cases; in 80.6% of these cases, verbal contact was successfully established with the perpetrator. Finally, 85.8% of incidents in which the intervention structure was completely deployed concluded with the voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator. For a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the sample use in the present study, see Michaud et al. (2008) .
PREDICTION OF PERPETRATOR'S VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
To predict the recourse to autoaggressive and heteroaggressive behaviors during hostage and barricade incidents, two logistic regression analyses were performed, using the six static personal factors and the six static situational factors. Results are shown in Table 2 .
The first logistic regression model allows effective prediction of the recourse to autoaggressive behavior by the perpetrator during the incident (χ 2 = 66.57, p < .001; AUC = .75, p < .001). The 12 predictors making up the model explain 19.6% of the variance of the dependent variable. The five best predictors were (a) a history of known suicide attempts (OR = 4.72, p < .001), (b) the fact that the call to emergency services was made by the perpetrator himself or herself (OR = 3.45, p < .01), (c) the presence of known psychiatric problems (OR = 1.99, p < .01), (d) the triggering of the incident by conjugal or familial problems (OR = 1.86, p < .05), and (e) the taking of at least one hostage (OR = 0.48, p < .05). The CART model presented in Figure 1 has a slightly better predictive power than its logistic regression model (AUC = .78, p < .001) but does not identify the presence of known psychiatric problems as a predictive factor for autoaggressive behaviors. Nevertheless, it indicates that being armed has a significant impact on the risk of autoaggressive behaviors by the perpetrator, but only if the individual has no known suicide attempt history. In addition, the decision tree indicates that age influences the propensity to autoaggressive behaviors in individuals who are armed, who have not contacted emergency services, who have no known suicide attempt history, and whose incident was not triggered by conjugal or familial problems. It is also clear that the second logistic regression model also effectively predicts the recourse to heteroaggressive behavior by the perpetrator during the incident (χ 2 = 97.78, p < .001; AUC = .75, p < .001). Thus, the 12 predictors of the model explain 25.1% of the variance of the dependent variable. The six best predictors were (a) at least one hostage having been taken (OR = 3.97, p < .001), (b) a perpetrator barricaded in a residential home (OR = 3.84, p < .001), (c) intoxication by alcohol and/or drugs and/or medication (OR = 2.35, p < .001), (d) the fact that the call to emergency services was made by the perpetrator himself or herself (OR = 1.90, p < .05), (e) the number of convictions for violent crimes (OR = 1.07, p < .05), and (f) the number of weapons in the perpetrator's possession (OR = 1.16, p < .05). The corresponding CART model, presented in Figure 2 , has a predictive power identical to its logistic regression model (AUC = .75, p < .001). However, the decision tree shows that the number of convictions for nonviolent crimes is also a predictor of heteroaggressive behaviors, although only for individuals who are armed, not intoxicated, have no more than two convictions for violent crimes, and are barricaded in a residential home.
PREDICTION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF TURNING POINTS OF THE INCIDENT
To predict the occurrence of three turning points of the incident, three other logistic regression analyses were performed using the same 12 independent factors. Furthermore, six other dynamic situational factors with appropriate temporal relationships (the independent variables had to have been measured before the dependent variables) were progressively integrated into the models. Results are presented in Table 3 . The first logistic regression model effectively predicts the complete deployment of the specialized crisis-intervention structure (χ 2 = 48.88, p < .001; AUC = .72, p < .001), the 12 predictors explaining 14.5% of the variance of this dependent variable. The four best predictors were (a) the presence of known psychiatric problems (OR = 2.00, p < .01), (b) the triggering of the incident by conjugal or familial problems (OR = 1.91, p < .01), (c) age (OR = 1.02, p < .05), and (d) the number of weapons in the perpetrator's possession (OR = 1.26, p < .05). The CART model, presented in Figure 3 , has a slightly poorer predictive power than does the corresponding logistic regression model (AUC = .69, p < .001). In addition to the four preceding predictors, the decision tree also identifies the physical location of the incident as a predictor of the complete deployment of the crisis-intervention structure, but only in cases involving individuals with known psychiatric problems. The number of convictions for violent crimes is a predictive factor in the CART model, but only for individuals with no known psychiatric problems, armed with two weapons or less, and whose incident was triggered by conjugal or familial problems.
The second logistic regression model effectively predicts the success of attempts to make verbal contact with the perpetrator following the deployment of the crisis-intervention structure (χ 2 = 30.39, p < .01; AUC = .72, p < .001). The 14 predictors explain 13.3% of the variance of the dependent variable. The three best predictors were (a) at least one gunshot having been fired since the beginning of the incident (OR = 0.34, p < .001), (b) age (OR = 0.97, p < .05), and (c) the number of hours elapsed before the perpetrator talked to a negotiator (OR = 0.90, p < .05). The CART model, presented in Figure 4 , has a slightly poorer predictive power than does the corresponding logistic regression model (AUC = .67, p < .001). The CART model does not identify the presence of gunshots since the beginning of the incident as a significant predictor but does suggest that the triggering event of the incident is a predictor of a successful verbal contact with perpetrators who waited less than 4.3 hours before talking to a negotiator and were no older than 49.
Finally, the last logistic regression model effectively predicts the voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator once the crisis-intervention structure has been deployed (χ 2 = 31.50, p < .05; AUC = .73, p < .001). The 18 predictors explain 16.3% of the variance of the dependent variable. The three most significant predictors were (a) the total duration of the negotiation period, as a proportion of the total duration of the operation (OR = 1.02, p < .01), (b) the taking of at least one hostage (OR = 0.36, p < .05), and (c) the firing of at least one gunshot since the beginning of the incident (OR = 0.50, p < .05). The CART model, presented in Figure 5 , has a poorer predictive power than the corresponding logistic regression model (AUC = .65, p < .001). The decision tree identifies only one significant predictor, namely the total duration of the negotiation period, as a proportion of the total duration of the operation. The CART model indicates that 94.5% of the incidents in which this proportion exceeded 50% ended in the voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator, compared to 79.8% of the incidents in which this proportion was less than this critical threshold of 50%. 
DISCUSSION
The nature, frequently described as unpredictable, of hostage and barricade incidents naturally calls into question the ability to effectively predict the outcome of these high-risk situations. The results of this study indicate that it is possible not only to predict the sequence of events in these incidents but also to do so with considerable precision. The AUC coefficients of the logistic regression models (.72 to .75) and CART models (.65 to .78) indicate that the models have fair predictive power (Swets, 1988) . This predictive power compares well to that obtained in other studies in which the prediction of violence is a preoccupation (Quinsey et al., 1998) . Although results from both models varied, AUC comparisons using the method of DeLong et al. (1988) revealed no significant differences between the logistic regression models and their corresponding CART models.
One of the main criticisms noted in the introduction was that prediction during hostage and barricade incidents has been based exclusively on clinical criteria drawn from police experience; for this reason, it appeared relevant to develop probabilistic criteria that would improve and organize this prediction. The logistic regression analyses in this study demonstrate that several risk factors discussed in the introduction and identified by practitioners who have studied hostage and barricade incidents are empirically well founded. However, the problems with so-called clinical predictions are related not to the poor choice of predictors but to their ineffective combination (Meehl, 1954) . Practitioners' difficulty in making accurate predictions is partly related to the nonoptimal weighting and organization of predictors. Just as logistic regression permits the attribution of relative weight to various predictors, other statistical techniques such as recursive partitioning modeling allow predictors to be reorganized in mechanical or algorithmic structures (Grove & Meehl, 1996) .
The CART models are much better suited to concrete application, for several reasons. First, the sequential nature of these hierarchical prediction models-and their use of conditional probabilities-seems to mirror the decision-making logic of police forces managing critical incidents (Zimmerman, 2006) . Second, the CART models allow the identification of subtle interaction effects that are difficult to detect with traditional main-effect models. The generation and testing of such interaction effects by logistic regression requires a preexisting theoretical organization, which is problematic in a field of study such as hostage and barricade incidents, in which there are currently no theoretical models. Finally, the CART models' simple representation of relationships is readily transposable to the field and easily understood and interpreted by nonspecialists.
THE DUAL NATURE OF THE TIME FACTOR
Several authors have underscored the importance of negotiators saving time during hostage and barricade incidents (Fuselier, 1981; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Mullins, 2003; Strentz, 2005; St-Yves, Michaud, & Tanguay, 2007; Van Zandt, 1991; Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005) . Letting time pass has decided advantages during hostage and barricade incidents, regardless of whether it serves to (a) reduce the anxiety or emotional burden of the individual in crisis, (b) completely and optimally deploy a crisisintervention structure, (c) intensively gather information, (d) create a relationship of trust between the perpetrator and negotiators, (e) increase the chances of establishing the Stockholm syndrome (if there are hostages), (f) reduce the undesirable effects of intoxicants, and/or (g) foster the desire for certain basic, but negotiable, needs (eating, sleeping, smoking). However, two observations in this study contradict the widespread idea that time is always on the police's side during critical incidents. First, from the moment that the emergency call is made, every hour that passes without contact with a negotiator diminishes the chances that a successful verbal contact will be established with the perpetrator. Our results indicate that no more than 4.3 hours should pass before initiating contact attempts with a perpetrator; after this time, the chances of making verbal contact diminish. This is a significant drawback that limits the possibilities of beginning effective negotiations intended to increase the chances of voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator. Second, the greater the proportion of the operation spent in negotiations, the greater the probabilities of voluntary and nonviolent surrender of the perpetrator. This result underscores the crucial importance of not only negotiation per se but also maximizing the duration of negotiation by minimizing the periods in which there is no verbal contact between the perpetrator and negotiators. Maintaining a constant communication channel between the police (emitter) and the individual in crisis (receptor) allows the latter to vent negative emotions, establish a relationship of trust with negotiators, find alternatives to the situation, and minimize the time available to brood over problems. Negotiators should make the establishment of continual verbal contact with the perpetrator a priority, as it appears to be one of the primary guarantees of his or her voluntary and nonviolent surrender. Our results show that the threshold duration of negotiation for improving the chances of voluntary and nonviolent surrender is 50%, which means that at least 50% of the total duration of the operation should be spent in negotiation. Because hostage and barricade incidents are laced with imponderables (e.g., technical problems, interruption of communication by the perpetrator, categorical refusal of the perpetrator to establish verbal contact), maintaining negotiations for more than half the operation may prove particularly difficult. However, the incapability to establish sustained communication is usually because of the whims of the receptor rather than failures by the emitter.
THE PAST AS KEY TO THE FUTURE
The presence of a history of known suicide attempts in perpetrators multiplies the chances of autoaggressive behaviors during the critical incident fivefold. The presence of a suicidal history is an established risk factor for suicide (Kessler et al., 1999) , reflecting the idea that past autoaggressive behaviors effectively predict similar behaviors in the future. If autoaggression is already part of an individual's repertoire of solutions for overcoming specific obstacles, the occurrence of a new, apparently insurmountable problem (i.e., the triggering event of the critical incident) will predispose him or her to adopt this adaptive operational mode. The reaction of a suicidal individual to his or her previous suicide attempt is nevertheless an essential element to be taken into consideration. For instance, research by Henriques, Wenzel, Brown, and Beck (2005) suggests that among individuals who have attempted suicide, the risk of committing suicide in the future are 2.5 times greater in individuals who regret not having died than in individuals who are ambivalent or happy to be alive. Furthermore, the literature on violence provides many examples of previous violent behavior being the best predictor of future violent behavior (Salekin et al., 1996) . This pattern can also be seen in critical incidents: The greater an individual's history of criminal violence, the greater the chances that he or she will resort to heteroaggressive behaviors during the incident. Similarly, individuals who see violence as a conflict resolution strategy will be more inclined to be violent in the face of a new conflict.
THE ORIGIN OF THE EMERGENCY CALL AS AN INDICATOR OF IMMINENT DANGER
When it is the perpetrator who makes the call to emergency services, the risks of autoaggressive and heteroaggressive behaviors during the incident significantly increase. Such an act by a suicidal individual indicates an urgent situation and suggests that the perpetrator is at the end of the suicidal process, alone, despairing, and in pain. The call to authorities is thus part of a final attempt to obtain the aid, support, and audience that will perhaps help one finally find an alternate solution that will revive his or her hope. The recourse to autoaggressive behaviors is thus imminent, as individuals generally make the call at the precise moment that they can no longer tolerate their suffering. For some, the emergency call to authorities may reflect an explicit plan in which the presence of the police is a required element (quest for an audience, desire for publicity, need for an intermediary to convey a message, etc.). The incident is thus not circumstantial, but planned, with precise objectives (suicide, murder, ransom, specific demands, etc.). As a result, violence toward those who present an obstacle to the end in question is a possibility.
KING OF THE CASTLE
In critical incidents, individuals barricaded in a residential home are 4 times more likely to resort to some form of violence toward others. There are two main reasons for this. The first reflects the "king of the castle" pattern of behavior (Flood & Dalfonzo, 2005) : Most barricaded individuals consider themselves safe, indeed untouchable, in a residential home (which belongs to them 85% to 90% of the time, see Michaud et al., 2008) . Therefore, some may react very strongly to the possible loss of their last bastion, and their ferocious resistance may take the form of violence toward others. The second is derived from the advantages conferred on a perpetrator by being barricading in his or her own residence: a known environment, effective protection by the walls of the building, availability of several highquality shooting positions (windows, doors, roof), ability, in many cases, to see the police approach the location, and full control over everything that occurs within the environment (particularly with regard to the treatment of hostages).
THE HOSTAGE AS "SUPPORTING CAST"
Research on critical incidents has often seen hostages as fundamental structural elements, occupying a central and preponderant place in the conceptualization of these highrisk events. However, the results of this study do not corroborate this widespread view. In fact, our results suggest that the taking of hostages is of only minor importance for the general comprehension of this type of situation. Although the analyses indicate that the holding of a hostage increases the risk of heteroaggressive behaviors and of the violent conclusion of the incident, its importance is far from dominant. Rather than being the foundation of critical incidents, the taking of hostages appears to be but one of a large number of risk factors to be taken into account, with no exceptional contribution to the overall variance. It is certainly true that some situations are almost exclusively focused on the presence of a hostage, particularly when the hostage is used as an intensely negotiated currency of exchange. However, the prevalence of this type of event seems so low (McMains & Mullins, 2001; Michaud et al., 2008) that its impact on the overall understanding of critical incidents is negligible. Therefore, our results do not support a dichotomous conception of critical incidents based on the presence or absence of a hostage.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
To optimize decision making during hostage and barricade incidents, this study attempted, through an empirical approach, to organize and improve prediction. Through statistical analyses, the study demonstrated that it was possible to use a series of static and dynamic individual and situational factors to predict the sequence of events of critical incidents effectively. Several valuable predictors that can be readily identified and evaluated by decision makers were identified; each of these has its own predictive power and makes a specific contribution to the overall understanding of this type of high-risk situation.
This study does, however, have methodological limitations that should be noted. First, as indicated above, the sample underrepresents less "problematic" critical incidents as well as those occurring in highly urban settings. Second, recommended methodological strategies inevitably underestimate the prevalence of psychiatric problems and suicidal history among the instigators of this type of incident. Furthermore, the predictive analyses of perpetrators' aggressive behaviors follow a dichotomous logic that disregards the continuous nature of the spectrum of violent behavior. For example, verbal threats were given the same weight as suicide or murder; this limits the scope and generalizability of the results obtained. This situation is essentially because of the low prevalence of successful suicides (8.9% of the total sample), murder of hostages (1.4% of the total sample), and murder of police personnel (0.2% of the total sample). Finally, for methodological reasons, several aspects of hostage and barricade incidents could not be coded (negotiator's characteristics, nature of negotiation, nature of interactions between the hostage takers and their captors, etc.), which means that some of the models presented here could be underspecified.
The objective of this study was to develop an integrated and formalized conception of critical incidents to optimize decision making. In addition to testing the validity of our results, future studies should attempt to develop a more integrated view of the "lead actors" and their motives.
